On 04/28/2016 04:02 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
The current bounds checking of both source and target types
requires allowing any domain that has access to the child domain
to also have the same permissions to the parent, which is undesirable.
Drop the target bounds checking.
Making this change fully functional requires a corresponding kernel
change; this change only allows one to build policies that would
otherwise violate the bounds checking on target type. The kernel
change is required to allow the permissions at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
libsepol/src/hierarchy.c | 26 --------------------------
1 file changed, 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libsepol/src/hierarchy.c b/libsepol/src/hierarchy.c
index 6f73195..ba65978 100644
--- a/libsepol/src/hierarchy.c
+++ b/libsepol/src/hierarchy.c
@@ -329,32 +329,6 @@ static int bounds_check_rule(sepol_handle_t *handle, policydb_t *p,
if (rc) goto exit;
}
}
- if (ebitmap_get_bit(&p->attr_type_map[tgt - 1], child - 1)) {
- avtab_key.target_type = parent;
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&p->attr_type_map[src - 1], tnode, i) {
- if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(tnode, i))
- continue;
- avtab_key.source_type = i + 1;
- if (avtab_key.source_type == child) {
- /* Checked above */
- continue;
- }
- d = bounds_not_covered(global_avtab, cur_avtab,
- &avtab_key, data);
- if (!d) continue;
- td = p->type_val_to_struct[i];
- if (td && td->bounds) {
- avtab_key.source_type = td->bounds;
- d = bounds_not_covered(global_avtab, cur_avtab,
- &avtab_key, data);
- if (!d) continue;
- }
- (*numbad)++;
- rc = bounds_add_bad(handle, i+1, child, class, d, bad);
- if (rc) goto exit;
- }
- }
-
exit:
return rc;
}
We also don't need to expand the tgt. I will send a new and improved patch.
Jim
--
James Carter <jwcart2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
National Security Agency
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