On 03/24/2016 10:31 AM, Dominick Grift wrote:
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On 03/24/2016 02:30 PM, Miroslav Grepl wrote:
On 03/24/2016 02:24 PM, Dominick Grift wrote:
On 03/24/2016 02:14 PM, Miroslav Grepl wrote:
<snip>
added the access vector back in but that seems to not make
any differenc e.
So you are still getting the same error message, right?
not quite right:
It now longer shows this: "Failed to translate security class
context"
So that part seems to have been fixed by adding the access
vector
however this error is still the same:
pam_selinux(sshd:session): Security context
wheel.id:wheel.role:wheel.subj:s0-s0:c0.c1023 is not allowed
for wheel.id:wheel.role:wheel.s ubj:s0-s0:c0.c1023 Mar 24
13:43:03 void sshd[14723]: pam_selinux(sshd:session): Unable to
get valid context for kcinimod
So looking at the code:
src_context = context_new (src); dst_context = context_new
(dst); context_range_set(dst_context,
context_range_get(src_context)); if (debug) pam_syslog(pamh,
LOG_NOTICE, "Checking if %s mls range valid for %s", dst,
context_str(dst_context));
retval = security_compute_av(context_str(dst_context), dst,
class, bit, &avd); context_free(src_context);
context_free(dst_context); if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed)
!= bit)) return 0;
return 1;
it appears that security_compute_av returns bad. But i can't
figure out how to reproduce that with "compute_av":
# compute_av wheel.id:wheel.role:wheel.subj:s0-s0:c0.c1023
wheel.id:wheel.role:wheel.subj:s0-s0:c0.c1023 process
allowed = { fork sigchld sigkill signull signal getsched
setsched setpgid getattr setfscreate }
This works fine with stock fedora policy BTW. this seems to be a
DSSP specific issue. I am wondering if my policy has a bug
somewhere...
That's my point. If it is a bug in your policy or there is a bug
related to CIL. I can try to install your DSSP policy and check
it.
This:
$ compute_av sys.id:sys.role:sshd.sshd.subj:s0
wheel.id:wheel.role:wheel.subj:s0-s0:c0.c1023 process allowed= {
transition signal dyntransition } auditdeny { fork sigchld sigkill
sigstop signull signal ptrace getsched setsched getsession getpgid
setpgid getcap setcap share getattr setexec setfscreate setrlimit
setcurrent execmem execstack execheap setkeycreate setsockcreate
0xc0000000 }
what is "0xc0000000"? am i missing av perms for process? They seem to
be complete above
- --
Key fingerprint = 5F4D 3CDB D3F8 3652 FBD8 02D5 3B6C 5F1D 2C7B 6B02
https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3B6C5F1D2C7B6B02
Dominick Grift
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I think this check is checking contains.
class context
{
translate
contains
}
The idea was you could run a system that only went up to Secret level, then if a user attempted
to login as TopSecret he would be blocked. I think that is what this check is all about.
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