Re: security_bounded_transition fails

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On Fri, Dec 18, 2015 at 11:20:56AM +0100, Dominick Grift wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 18, 2015 at 09:46:03AM +0100, Dominick Grift wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 18, 2015 at 06:12:21AM +0000, Hannu Savolainen wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > > 
> > > I'm having a problem with a multithreaded application. It does lengthy  initialization in advance under relatively privileged context and then switches to a less privileged one after the moment when the actual request arrives. After that it will create a chrooted container and join all threads to a new SELinux context.
> > > 
> > > However the transition fails with audit message "op=security_bounded_transition result=denied oldcontext=old_context newcontext=new_context".
> > > 
> > > Is there any policy rule that could be used to fix this or is this just not supported?
> > 
> > I believe that the parent domain should have the same permissions as the child
> > domain (because the child is bounded to the parent).
> > 
> > This can be pretty painful to deal with.
> > 
> > For example: if the child domain should be able to bind tcp_socket to
> > http_port_t type port objects then so should the parent.
> > 
> > That one would be relatively easy to identify. There are other
> > instances though that are harder to spot.
> > 
> > Eventually, once you dealt with all the requirements, those bounded
> > messages should dissapear.
> 
> Here is one more not so straightforward example.
> 
> You may have a auto type transition rule in place that tells selinux that the
> parent should run the child's executable file with a auto type
> transition to the child domain.
> 
> That means that the child's executable file type should be a entry
> object to the child domain type.
> 
> You allowed for example:
> 
> allow child_t child_exec_t:file entrypoint;
> 
> That means that child_exec_t now also must be a entry object to the
> parent domain type:
> 
> allow parent_t child_exec_t:file entrypoint;
> 
> Else the transition might not work because the parent must have all the
> permissions that the child has.
> 

Also you should have a type_bounds statement in place if you do not have
one already:

http://selinuxproject.org/page/Bounds_Rules

> > 
> > > 
> > > Best regards,
> > > 
> > > Hannu
> > > 
> > > 
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Selinux mailing list
> > > Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
> > > To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
> > 
> > -- 
> > 02DFF788
> > 4D30 903A 1CF3 B756 FB48  1514 3148 83A2 02DF F788
> > https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x314883A202DFF788
> > Dominick Grift
> 
> -- 
> 02DFF788
> 4D30 903A 1CF3 B756 FB48  1514 3148 83A2 02DF F788
> https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x314883A202DFF788
> Dominick Grift

- -- 
02DFF788
4D30 903A 1CF3 B756 FB48  1514 3148 83A2 02DF F788
https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x314883A202DFF788
Dominick Grift
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2
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=l8j2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
_______________________________________________
Selinux mailing list
Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.




[Index of Archives]     [Selinux Refpolicy]     [Linux SGX]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Yosemite Photos]     [Yosemite Camping]     [Yosemite Campsites]     [KDE Users]     [Gnome Users]

  Powered by Linux