On 12/13/2015 2:06 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > On Friday, December 11, 2015 05:14:38 PM Stephen Smalley wrote: >> Perhaps we could provide a new fixed-size tokenized version of the >> security context string for export to userspace that could be embedded >> in the binder transaction structure? This could avoid both the >> limitations of the current secid (e.g. limited to 32 bits, no >> stackability) and the overhead of copying context strings on every IPC. > On Friday, December 11, 2015 04:24:48 PM Casey Schaufler wrote: >> How about this: Provide an alias mechanism for secctx. There would then >> be a secid (32bits) a secctx (arbitrary text string) and a secalias which >> could be a limited string of some length. You could use the alias in place >> of the secctx anywhere you liked. > My initial reaction to the secalias idea isn't overly positive. It seems like > a kludge with a lot of duplication, both in terms of code and concept, and a > lot of risk for confusion both by users and policy writers. I think if we > really wanted to limit the security label string format to a small size we > should have done that from the start, it's too late now. The alias would be a user space controlled mapping. The kernel code would only be involved at the border. I would never expect policy to be written using aliases. As for being a kludge, yeah, there's some of that, but I think that's true with the secid, too. > Assuming we see some binder performance numbers, and the numbers are bad, I'm > a little more open to doing something with the secid token. Up to this point > we haven't made any guarantees about the token and we haven't exported it > outside the kernel so there is some ability to change it to fit our needs. > Granted, this isn't perfect solution either, and perhaps ultimately we would > need something else, but I think it is worth looking into this first before we > introduce another string label. I agree with getting numbers before someone dashes off to make a premature optimization that exposes secids. If the numbers are bad I would hope that the developers would look at fixing binder rather than exposing (and forever requiring) secids. _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx. To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.