On Fri, Dec 11, 2015 at 1:37 PM, Daniel Cashman <dcashman@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Hello, > > I would like to write a patch that would expose, via selinuxfs, the > mapping between secids in the kernel and security contexts to > user-space, but before doing so wanted to get some feedback as to > whether or not such an endeavor could have any support upstream. The > direct motivation for this is the desire to communicate calling security > ids/contexts over binder IPC on android for use in a user-space object > manager. Passing the security ids themselves would be simpler and more > efficient in the critical kernel path, but they currently have no > user-space meaning. In general we try to avoid exposing the secid tokens outside the kernel, I view them as an implementation hack designed to make it easier to manage and operate on the security labels in the kernel. I suspect you will hear something very similar from Casey and the other Smack developers. Another consideration is the long standing LSM stacking effort, they have several good reasons for wanting to abolish the secid token, propagating it to userspace would make that all but impossible. While I'm sympathetic to your desire for less complexity and better performance in passing security labels, from a kernel perspective I think we lose too much in exporting the secid tokens outside the LSM. -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx. To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
