On 05/27/2014 03:42 AM, dE wrote: > On 05/23/14 11:18, dE wrote: >> As we know, the user_r does not allow many processes to have high privilege types (system_t for e.g. which's tailored for a single program named X), if such a process is executed, it'll have a type of user_t. >> >> However system_t specifies restrictions on the program exactly as per X's specifications -- it wont allow the program to do anything outside what's it supposed to do. >> >> But that's not the same for user_t -- this type is generic and there are many things that user_t allows which system_t does not. >> >> This may form a security vector; a vulnerable program which should run as system_t but is not run cause user_r does not allow that type, this allows the program to do many things which it's not designed to do; so basically this bypasses SELinux restrictions as put on by system_t. >> >> So, is there any way to prevent this form happening -- or can we specify in the policy what type to run the program as when it's run by a user with role user_r or any other user which is not allowed system_t? >> >> As an e.g. we may see systemctl. > > Is this concern real? Moving thread to refpolicy mail list. -- Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx. To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
