As we know, the user_r does not allow many processes to have high
privilege types (system_t for e.g. which's tailored for a single program
named X), if such a process is executed, it'll have a type of user_t.
However system_t specifies restrictions on the program exactly as per
X's specifications -- it wont allow the program to do anything outside
what's it supposed to do.
But that's not the same for user_t -- this type is generic and there are
many things that user_t allows which system_t does not.
This may form a security vector; a vulnerable program which should run
as system_t but is not run cause user_r does not allow that type, this
allows the program to do many things which it's not designed to do; so
basically this bypasses SELinux restrictions as put on by system_t.
So, is there any way to prevent this form happening -- or can we specify
in the policy what type to run the program as when it's run by a user
with role user_r or any other user which is not allowed system_t?
As an e.g. we may see systemctl.
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