Yes that would be the long term fix. But it would involve journal
labelling individual data records. IE Records from audit.log would be
audit_log_t, while messages from syslog would be var_log_t, Or some
other kind of crazyness.
On 04/24/2014 11:03 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
> On Thu, 2014-04-24 at 10:59 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>> I don't disagree. I would think the real solution to this would be to
>> not allow sysadm_t to get to SystemHigh, where all of the logging data
>> will be stored.
> make journalctl a userspace object manager and do selinux checks on if
> it can see individual records? so secadm_t running journalctl would see
> them and sysadm running journalctl wouldn't see them?
>
> Sounds elegant. Who is going to code it? *NOT IT!*
>
>> On 04/24/2014 09:22 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
>>> They would be equivalent if and only if journald had CAP_AUDIT_READ.
>>>
>>> I suggest you take CAP_AUDIT_READ away from journald on systems which
>>> need the secadm/sysadmin split (which is a ridiculously stupid split
>>> anyway, but who am I to complain?)
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 11:52 AM, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> Meaning looking at the journal would be equivalent to looking at
>>>> /var/log/audit/audit.log.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 04/23/2014 11:37 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 11:36 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>>>>>> I guess the problem would be that the sysadm_t would be able to look at
>>>>>> the journal which would now contain the audit content.
>>>>> right. so include it in the sysadm_secadm bool
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 04/23/2014 10:42 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
>>>>>>> On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 09:40 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>>>>>>>> Here are the capabilities we currently give to sysadm_t with
>>>>>>>> sysadm_secadm 1.0.0 Disabled
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { chown dac_override
>>>>>>>> dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid setpcap linux_immutable
>>>>>>>> net_bind_service net_broadcast net_admin net_raw ipc_lock ipc_owner
>>>>>>>> sys_rawio sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_pacct sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice
>>>>>>>> sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config mknod lease audit_write setfcap } ;
>>>>>>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { setgid setuid sys_chroot }
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability2 { syslog block_suspend } ;
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> cap_audit_write might be a problem?
>>>>>>> cap_audit_write is fine.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> syslogd_t (aka journal) is going to need the new permission
>>>>>>> cap_audit_read. Also, as steve pointed out, someone may be likely to
>>>>>>> want to be able to disable that permission easily.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -Eric
>>>>>>>
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