On Tue, 2014-04-22 at 22:25 -0400, Steve Grubb wrote: > On Tuesday, April 22, 2014 09:31:52 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > This is a patch set Eric Paris and I have been working on to add a > > restricted capability read-only netlink multicast socket to kernel audit to > > enable userspace clients such as systemd/journald to receive audit logs, in > > addition to the bidirectional auditd userspace client. > > Do have the ability to separate of secadm_r and sysadm_r? By allowing this, we > will leak to a sysadmin that he is being audited by the security officer. In a > lot of cases, they are one in the same person. But for others, they are not. I > have a feeling this will cause problems for MLS systems. Why? This requires CAP_AUDIT_READ. Just don't give CAP_AUDIT_READ to places you don't want to have read permission. Exactly the same as you don't give CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to sysadm_r. (If we are giving CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to sysadm_r and you think that any file protections on /var/log/audit/audit.log are adequate we are fooling ourselves!) > Also, shouldn't we have an audit event for every attempt to connect to this > socket? We really need to know where this information is getting leaked to. We certainly can. What would you like to see in that event? -Eric _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx. To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
