Re: Strange context on unix_stream_socket

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On 01/28/2014 12:12 PM, Ole Kliemann wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 11:20:23AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 01/26/2014 05:46 PM, Ole Kliemann wrote:
>>> I have written my own little socket test program. Process P1 with 
>>> context TYPE1:RANGE1 creates a socket and listens on it. P2 with 
>>> context TYPE2:RANGE2 connects to this socket.
>>>
>>> Process P1 accepts the connection. The socket created throught 
>>> accept() in P1 has actually the context TYPE1:RANGE2.
>>>
>>> Is this expected behavior? 
>>
>> Yes.  That was the behavior desired by the MLS/LSPP community, as they
>> want the socket to mirror the client level for multi-level servers, and
>> in the single-level server case, you are only allowed to connect at the
>> same level.
> 
> Thank you for the clarification.
> 
> Is there no way to control this? To state more precisly: I can 
> very well _connect_ to everything the policy allows me to, I then 
> just cannot use this connection. That's a bit weird.
> 
> Although I admit, the problems arise from my specific situation 
> where I have one realm the consist of only one type but is 
> separated by MLS and another realm that is MLS-ignorant and uses 
> TE. All vectors running between the two realms are also only 
> controll by TE. When I now use sockets between the MLS and 
> non-MLS realm these connections should only be controlled by TE,
> but as a result of above mentioned labeling behavior, MLS 
> suddenly gets in the way.
> 
> I can imagine, in an MLS-only environment this behavior makes 
> more sense; specificly in the case of multi-level servers. All 
> the more desirable it would be if the policy was to make such 
> labeling decisions at the discretion of the policy writer.

Yes, in prior implementations we allowed it to be configurable as a
transition on the listening socket security context and the incoming
packet security context.  That would be preferable IMHO, but is not
possible today without kernel code changes.


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