Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: >> When a distro is run in a container it is desirable to be able to run >> the distro's security policy in that container. Ideally this will get >> addressed by being able to do some level of per user namespace stacking. >> Say selinux outside and apparmor inside a container. >> >> I think this would take a little more work than what Casey has currently >> devised but I am hopeful an additional layer of stacking can be added >> after Casey has merged the basic layer of stacking. > > Would that be per-container LSM lists? I hadn't thought about > doing that, and don't know how you might implement it, but I > suppose it could work. Essentially per-container LSM lists. The semantics would be that first you perform the global LSM list checks, and then you perform the container LSM list checks (with additional layers if containers are nested). For LSM modules that depend on security labels I think there would be a conflict that would prevent nesting. This is already implemented for capabilities. Something is already happening with apparmor. In practice it may just be a matter of getting the LSMs to be aware of the containers rather than having per container LSM lists. Especially as all of the hooks are called every time for every LSM. The important part is that the effect be nested policy. Having nested calls is likely to be unnecessary and inefficient if there is much nesting of containers going on. Eric -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
