Re: refpolicy is missing on lots of hits with audit2allow -R.

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 04/28/2010 02:12 PM, Joshua Brindle wrote:
> Karl MacMillan wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 11:34 AM, Daniel J Walsh<dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx> 
>> wrote:
> <snip>>
>>> I would argue that
>>>
>>> allow X etc_t:file read;
>>> allow X configfile:file read;
>>>
>>> Should be weighted equivalently if etc_t is a configfile or only
>>> slightly heavier, and just because etc_runtime_t or some other random
>>> types are configfile does not mean we need to add weight.
>>>
>>
> 
> I'm going to weigh in here even though policy isn't normally my thing.
> 
> I am very against reducing distance based on attribute match over
> individual unrelated types. allow X configfile:file read should be the
> exact same distance as having an allow rule for every type in configfile
> in the interface, otherwise you have inconsistent behavior and are
> rewarding interfaces that are overly broad.
> 
I agree but the question is on an AVC that needs

allow $1 etc_t:file read;


Which is a better match

allow $1 configfile:file read;

Or

allow $1 etc_t:file { read write };

> The reason for using sepolgen is to find the best match, not the most
> broad, if we wanted that we could make sepolgen 1000% less complicated
> and just return allow domain filetype:file *;
> 
> I suppose there is a fundamental difference in the use of the tool, the
> people I know that use it use it to find the best match, the way you
> want to use it is to fix the denial any way possible. These 2 usages
> conflict and we can't have people thinking they are making secure policy
> when in fact they aren't.
> 

Thats Bullshit.  I am trying to get the best match.  The example I
showed earlier the tool was getting way off, because it did not take
into effect attributes.  The access returned for a getattr was to allow
the domain to delete the file.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.14 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/

iEYEARECAAYFAkvYgBAACgkQrlYvE4MpobNo3ACeIkGbGm9mWWUaAVPkA8B64YTS
zMkAn3PhjVrB1cw0jSIZo7bUmmcK58e+
=A6kc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

[Index of Archives]     [Selinux Refpolicy]     [Linux SGX]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Yosemite Photos]     [Yosemite Camping]     [Yosemite Campsites]     [KDE Users]     [Gnome Users]

  Powered by Linux