Re: Windows-level enforcement in SELinux?

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On a system with selinux-policy-mls install you will find a file
/etc/selinux/mls/contexts/x_contexts which will give you an idea about
the labeling of various X object. X objects are label with the level
of the X application process and the mls constraints control
operations like copy/paste you mention which is prohibited.

Ted

On Tue, Nov 17, 2009 at 8:21 AM, Dyson, Mark L (IS) <Mark.Dyson@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> I’ll narrow the scope of my initial question a bit, here:  can SELinux
> support this sort of operation?  Some online literature seems to suggest
> otherwise but it’s admittedly a few years old.
>
>
>
> Thanks again,
>
> Mark
>
>
>
> From: owner-selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
> Behalf Of Dyson, Mark L (IS)
> Sent: Monday, November 16, 2009 10:09 AM
> To: selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Windows-level enforcement in SELinux?
>
>
>
> Hello,
>
> I’ve been tasked to map out a path for migrating a MLS application from
> Trusted Solaris to SELinux.  I’m sure I’ll have many questions to come, but
> after some initial readings one of my first is:
>
> How does SELinux label individual X-windows in a user session, so that (for
> example) data contained in a high-level security window cannot be copied and
> then pasted into a lower-level security window?
>
> Thanks in advance!
> Mark


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