RE: Windows-level enforcement in SELinux?

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Title: Windows-level enforcement in SELinux?

I’ll narrow the scope of my initial question a bit, here:  can SELinux support this sort of operation?  Some online literature seems to suggest otherwise but it’s admittedly a few years old.

 

Thanks again,

Mark

 

From: owner-selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Dyson, Mark L (IS)
Sent: Monday, November 16, 2009 10:09 AM
To: selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Windows-level enforcement in SELinux?

 

Hello,

I’ve been tasked to map out a path for migrating a MLS application from Trusted Solaris to SELinux.  I’m sure I’ll have many questions to come, but after some initial readings one of my first is:

How does SELinux label individual X-windows in a user session, so that (for example) data contained in a high-level security window cannot be copied and then pasted into a lower-level security window?

Thanks in advance!
Mark


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