Re: daemons and MCS categories

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Joe Nall wrote:
> 
> On May 11, 2009, at 12:11 AM, KaiGai Kohei wrote:
> 
>> Are anyone interested in the daemon process with mcs categories?
>>
>> My proposition tries to cover general daemon processes, but my
>> major concern is apache/httpd performing without any categories.
>> If we focus on the apache/httpd, we can add the following policy
>> within the mod_selinux.pp, and it enables to run httpd_t with
>> mcs categories.
>>
>>  optional_policy(`
>>      init_ranged_daemon_domain(httpd_t,httpd_exec_t,s0 - mcs_systemhigh)
>>  ')
>>
>> The mod_selinux.so is an apache/httpd module which enables to
>> change its own security context prior to launching contents
>> handler. We can set up the module to drop all the categories
>> for unauthorized http clients, and rest of requests to perform
>> with appropriate categories.
>>
>> The above rule will be available only when mod_selinux is installed.
>> I don't think it gives any impact for existing stuffs.
>>
>> Any comments?
> 
> FWIW, we run apache 1.3 out of xinetd at multiple contexts using labeled 
> networking. HTTP performance is surprisingly good. HTTPS performance is 
> unacceptable, so we are using an HTTPS reverse proxy in a DMZ for single 
> level network services to the 'enterprise'.

Are you saying that xinetd can launch multiple apache/httpd daemon processes
with individual security context? If so, unfortunatelly, it is different from
what I would like to achieve. :(

I guess the security context of the daemon process is determined prior to
receiving http-requests come from users, but the security context to be
assigned on web application depends on the authentication-header within
the http-request-headers, so we cannot know who connected to on xinetd time.

Or, are we talking about topics in different layer?

Thanks,
-- 
OSS Platform Development Division, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

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