On Thu, 2008-10-30 at 12:46 -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > On Thursday 30 October 2008 11:29:40 am Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@xxxxxxxxxx): > > > Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use > > > audit to make an A or B type decision instead of a security > > > decision. Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when > > > deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for > > > the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes > > > are root processes and should be less likely to be killed. These > > > types of security system requests should not be audited or logged > > > since they are not really security decisions. It would be possible > > > to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did > > > by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into > > > that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide > > > complex indirection. > > > > > > This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and > > > to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not > > > security decisions. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and 1. > > I.e. > > > > #define CAP_NOAUDIT 0 > > #define CAP_AUDIT 1 > > > > Otherwise, looks fine. > > As a general rule aren't boolean arguments like this frowned upon, with > variations on the function preferred, i.e. something like below? > > int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap); > int cap_capable_audit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap); Well from outside the "security" subsystem people should call either has_capability() has_capability_noaudit() or capable() (which calls has_capability()) How far down do I have to keep duplicating functionality to avoid booleans? -Eric -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
