On Thursday 30 October 2008 11:29:40 am Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@xxxxxxxxxx): > > Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use > > audit to make an A or B type decision instead of a security > > decision. Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when > > deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for > > the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes > > are root processes and should be less likely to be killed. These > > types of security system requests should not be audited or logged > > since they are not really security decisions. It would be possible > > to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did > > by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into > > that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide > > complex indirection. > > > > This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and > > to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not > > security decisions. > > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and 1. > I.e. > > #define CAP_NOAUDIT 0 > #define CAP_AUDIT 1 > > Otherwise, looks fine. As a general rule aren't boolean arguments like this frowned upon, with variations on the function preferred, i.e. something like below? int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap); int cap_capable_audit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap); -- paul moore linux @ hp -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
