Re: [PATCH 1/3] Thread/Child-Domain Assignment (rev.6)

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James Morris wrote:
On Mon, 25 Aug 2008, KaiGai Kohei wrote:

@@ -5228,11 +5232,14 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			do_each_thread(g, t) {
 				if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
 					read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+					if (!security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid))
+						goto boundary_ok;
 					return -EPERM;

Propagate the return value of security_bounded_transition().

OK, I'll fix it on the next.

Also, if the user/role bounds are not being used, should they be included in this? From the kernel point of view, unused code should never be added.

Existing named based hierarchy on users/roles are implemented using bounds
feature. If a user "staff_u.foo" is defined, the toolchain implicitly defines
bounds relationship with "staff_u", for example.

I don't provide an explicit way to define bounds (like TYPEBOUNDS) between
users/roles, but we can define it with existing grammar.

Thanks,
--
OSS Platform Development Division, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

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