Joe Nall wrote:
On Jun 18, 2008, at 7:20 PM, Eamon Walsh wrote:
Xavier Toth wrote:
I'm contemplating some AVC's that originate in metacity and am
wondering whether a window manager is a special case of an X client
that requires its' own policy. Are there things that a window manager
does that other X clients shouldn't? Also on an MLS system should the
window manager run at the users highwater mark or ranged?
The window manager basically needs the full run of the display.
When another application creates a window, the window manager
creates a second window with the titlebar and borders, and then
plops the application window down inside of it (reparents it). It
also moves windows around and resizes them, sets properties on them
(such as the _NET_WM_DESKTOP property that contains the desktop
number) and listens for events so it can tell when to change the
focus window. Finally, a compositing manager actually needs to read
the window contents. It's definitely a special-case app that's
going to need its own policy.
It almost certainly needs permissions on all windows that map to
both read and write in the MLS configuration. So it will need read-
and write-all-levels.
What other desktop related processes need MLS policies to be written
to get a minimally functional Fedora/Gnome enforcing X environment?
Don't know for sure...but probably gnome-session (starts up processes),
nautilus and gnome-panel (can be used to launch processes; gnome-panel
interacts with small applet windows that are inside it).
What window manager/environment do you use in your enforcing X
development and test?
I have one machine where I compile the full Xorg distribution, policy,
and a few other things (pam, gdm) from scratch. I just finished setting
up another machine that runs Fedora 9, with just refpolicy and XCB
compiled from source. This should make it easier for me to develop and
test policy. It's just running regular GNOME, although I may install
XFCE on it as well.
Do you have a start on a window manager policy that we could try?
It should be transitioned into a domain that has unconfined TE perms
over X objects, and is MLS trusted. After that it's a matter of seeing
what permissions regular applications need over window-manager created
windows, particularly decoration windows. They might need some
permissions over the window manager's windows since they might try to
manipulate the window-manager "decoration" windows that their own app
window is reparented into. To deal with this, I think that the window
manager is going to need to call SetWindowCreateContext to put window
decorations into the same context as the associated application window.
I'm hoping to try and make a patch to do this, this week.
--
Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
National Security Agency
--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
