Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, 2008-06-12 at 17:21 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
>> checkpolicy-2.0.16-2.fc10.x86_64
>> libsepol-2.0.30-1.fc10.x86_64
>>
>> Program terminated with signal 11, Segmentation fault.
>> [New process 6347]
>> #0 0x000000000041a155 in mls_semantic_level_expand ()
>> (gdb) bt
>> #0 0x000000000041a155 in mls_semantic_level_expand ()
>> #1 0x000000000041a3f9 in mls_semantic_range_expand ()
>> #2 0x000000000040dd0d in policydb_user_cache ()
>> #3 0x000000000040417e in hashtab_map ()
>> #4 0x000000000040d829 in policydb_index_others ()
>> #5 0x00000000004082e1 in link_modules ()
>> #6 0x00000000004036a7 in main (argc=<value optimized out>, argv=0x7fffe894e178) at dismod.c:761
>> (gdb) quit
>>
>> base.conf:
>> **********
>> class class1
>> sid sid1
>> class class1
>> {
>> perm1
>> perm2
>> }
>> sensitivity s0;
>> dominance { s0 }
>> category c0; category c1; category c2; category c3;
>> category c4; category c5; category c6; category c7;
>> category c8; category c9; category c10; category c11;
>> category c12; category c13; category c14; category c15;
>> category c16; category c17; category c18; category c19;
>> category c20; category c21; category c22; category c23;
>> level s0:c0.c23;
>> mlsconstrain class1 { perm1 perm2 }
>> ( h1 dom h2 );
>> attribute attr1;
>> type type1_t;
>> type type2_t;
>> role role1_r types { type1_t type2_t };
>> role role2_r types { type1_t type2_t };
>> allow type1_t type2_t: class1 { perm1 };
>> allow role1_r role2_r;
>> bool bool1 true;
>> user user1_u roles { role1_r } level s0 range s0 - s0:c0.c23;
>> sid sid1 user1_u:role1_r:type1_t:s0
>> fs_use_xattr ext2 user1_u:role1_r:type1_t:s0;
>> genfscon proc / user1_u:role1_r:type1_t:s0
>> nodecon ::1 FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:: user1_u:role1_r:type1_t:s0
>>
>> badmodule.te:
>> *************
>> module badmodule 1.0.0;
>> require {
>> user baduser_u;
>> type type2_t;
>> type type1_t;
>> class class1 perm1;
>> }
>>
>> allow type1_t type2_t : class1 perm1;
>>
>> ************
>> checkmodule -M -o base.mod base.conf
>> checkmodule -M -m -o badmodule.mod badmodule.te
>> sedismod base.mod
>> #l
>> #badmodule.mod
>>
>> ***BOOM***
>
> Interestingly doesn't occur on F9 for me, so likely a side effect of the
> user/role remapping support leading to earlier indexing/caching.
>
> Seems like the same issue as we had with mls_level_convert() in link.
> Patch below restores the correct behavior.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> ---
>
> libsepol/src/expand.c | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> Index: trunk/libsepol/src/expand.c
> ===================================================================
> --- trunk/libsepol/src/expand.c (revision 2908)
> +++ trunk/libsepol/src/expand.c (working copy)
> @@ -656,6 +656,10 @@
> if (!p->mls)
> return 0;
>
> + /* Required not declared. */
> + if (!sl->sens)
> + return 0;
> +
> l->sens = sl->sens;
> levdatum = (level_datum_t *) hashtab_search(p->p_levels.table,
> p->p_sens_val_to_name[l->
>
>
>
Is this sufficient? I did this last night and it seemed to work but I wanted to track down all users in the linker to see if there will be side effects. It is relatively hacky to 'expand' semantic sets in the linker, since the linked copy should be all syntactic. I'm trying to remember why we did this, the linker doesn't use user->cache or user->exp_range.
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