Re: Questions regarding labeled ipsec/MAC networking

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Hi Paul!

On Tue, 2008-06-10 at 11:39 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> I agree with Stephen, I don't think we want to ever use a SPD security 
> label as the SA's security label.  The security label of a SPD entry is 
> used to signify a specific IPsec configuration (endpoints, 
> transformations, ciphers, hmacs, etc.) where the security label of a SA 
> is used to signify the sending subject's security label (SSH versus 
> Firefox, SECRET versus TOP_SECRET, etc.).  This separation is really 
> the one nice thing I see about labeled IPsec because it allows you to 
> match a sending domain with a very specific IPsec configuration through 
> SELinux policy which allows you to make statements like all Firefox 
> traffic will be protected with ESP using AES-128 where all SSH traffic 
> will be protected with AH using SHA1.
> 
Yes, I agree. The separation is important. So, I will document PFP flag
is not applicable to select security context of SA.

> > 2. Security Gateways in MAC networking.
> >
> > In obsoleted rfc 2401 -IP Security Architecture, section 8.6
> > described an MLS security gateway using IPsec as:
> >
> >   "a security gateway acting as an outbound proxy, creating SAs for
> > MLS systems that originate packets forwarded by the gateway. These
> > MLS systems may explicitly label the packets to be forwarded, or the
> > whole originating network may have sensitivity characteristics
> > associated with it. The security gateway MUST create and use
> > appropriate SAs for AH, ESP or both, to protect such traffic it
> > forwards.
> >
> >    Similarly such a gateway SHOULD accept and process inbound AH
> > and/or ESP packets and forward appropriately, using explicit packet
> > labeling, or relying on the sensitivity characteristics of the
> > destination network."
> >
> > All mention of MLS networking as in rfc 2401 was left out in rfc
> > 4301. So I want to reintroduce it as MAC networking instead.
> >
> > Do we want to consider labeled ipsec for security gateways in MAC
> > networking?
> 
> Most definitely yes.
> 
> > 1. machines behind the security gateway that explicitly label the
> >    packets (CIPSO). This is stated above.
> >
> >    In this case above text is still applicable.
> >
> > 2. The whole originating network has a security context associated
> > with it. In this case, packets from machines behind the security
> > gateway are not explicitly labeled. These machines send their packets
> > to security security gateway to be forwarded. This incoming interface
> > of the security gateway is labeled. All packets arriving on it (from
> > machines behind the gateway) would be marked with this label. And
> > that would be the label used to negotiate and create the SAs for the
> > packets originating from behind the gateway.
> >
> >    Is this acceptable MAC networking for security gateways?
> 
> I think so, I know of several users who have multiple single label 
> networks connected to a multiple label network via a security 
> gateway/guard that handles the labeling/routing/multiplexing.  Just in 
> cased you missed the discussion earlier this year, check the SELinux 
> archives for the discussions around static/fallback labels (included 
> for the first time in 2.6.25).  The static/fallback labels can be used 
> to specify per-host, per-network, or per-interface security labels for 
> unlabeled traffic.
> 
Thanks for the pointer, I definitely will take a look. 

> As far as James' comments about assigning network peer security labels 
> with greater granularity than a single host, we discussed this quite a 
> bit in the static/fallback label threads; while it makes sense for 
> things like SECMARK, it makes less sense when you are talking about 
> unlabeled peers.  That said, I don't think a RFC specification needs to 
> restrict implementation from assigning network peer labels however they 
> see fit; I'm just not sure we would end up doing anything finer grained 
> than a single address.
> 
> Hopefully you will send your early drafts to this list for review? :)
> 
Sure!

regards, 
Joy

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