Re: I think this is a bug in the kernel

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On Fri, 2008-05-09 at 10:16 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
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> Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> | https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=445709
> |
> | libvirtd is clearly not ptracing the unconfined_t domain.  It is
> | problably looking under /proc for some information about the app that is
> | communicating with it.  It might be reading unconfined_t environment.  I
> | am not sure, but we generate a ptrace and stop the app from working.  My
> | only choice is to allow virtd to ptrace unconfined_t processes which is
> | not a good idea.  This has to be fixes in the kernel.
> |
> | Dan
> 
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> Replying to my own email...
> 
> Looks like the kernel has it on its todo list...
> 
> ~ *  Finer-grained proc checking (so that we don't require full ptrace
> permission just to read process state),
> 
> Well I think we need to jump the priority here.
> 
> User apps seem to be doing things like looking at the remote end of the
> socket and checking the environment for special cookies in the case of
> consolehelper/policykit.  Or may looking to see where the kerberos
> tickets are located.  Whether this is a legitimate use or not, it is
> being done.

That's decidedly racy and unsafe to do.  They shouldn't do that.

>   So we need to handle it.  But I have a real concern about
> allowing virtd_t to ptrace unconfined_t process.
> 
> Basically in order to allow virtd_t to verify the unconfined_t process
> that is trying to communicate with it, we need to allow it to read the
> memory of every unconfined_t process on the system.  Not good.


-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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