-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Stephen Smalley wrote: | On Fri, 2008-05-09 at 10:16 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote: |> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- |> Hash: SHA1 |> |> Daniel J Walsh wrote: |> | https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=445709 |> | |> | libvirtd is clearly not ptracing the unconfined_t domain. It is |> | problably looking under /proc for some information about the app that is |> | communicating with it. It might be reading unconfined_t environment. I |> | am not sure, but we generate a ptrace and stop the app from working. My |> | only choice is to allow virtd to ptrace unconfined_t processes which is |> | not a good idea. This has to be fixes in the kernel. |> | |> | Dan |> |> - -- |> This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. |> If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx |> with |> the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message. |> |> Replying to my own email... |> |> Looks like the kernel has it on its todo list... |> |> ~ * Finer-grained proc checking (so that we don't require full ptrace |> permission just to read process state), |> |> Well I think we need to jump the priority here. |> |> User apps seem to be doing things like looking at the remote end of the |> socket and checking the environment for special cookies in the case of |> consolehelper/policykit. Or may looking to see where the kerberos |> tickets are located. Whether this is a legitimate use or not, it is |> being done. | | That's decidedly racy and unsafe to do. They shouldn't do that. | |> So we need to handle it. But I have a real concern about |> allowing virtd_t to ptrace unconfined_t process. |> |> Basically in order to allow virtd_t to verify the unconfined_t process |> that is trying to communicate with it, we need to allow it to read the |> memory of every unconfined_t process on the system. Not good. | | I think this is policykit that is triggering it. And with the advent of ~ /proc/$$/sessionid it will become less racy. But for now it is what they do. policykit is looking for a unique identifier to identify the "session" of the process that is trying to communicate with it. It then uses consolekit to determine whether the "session" is on the console as opposed to logged in via ssh or some other remote application. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAkgkX/8ACgkQrlYvE4MpobMaewCgr5tbkCqKcMJi/KcOwIDiUK9z NfsAoNsEe4bxOJV8z+bWeRwdPwUDVbTW =/nnR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
