Re: Disabling SELinux by kernel vulnerability

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On Tue, 12 Feb 2008 10:45:41 -0500
"Todd Miller" wrote:

> Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> > So this exploit, don't you neet to write to /proc?  xguest_t should
> > not be allowed to do this?
> 
> No, you don't need to be able to write to /proc to exploit the bug.
> Having read access /proc/kallsyms just makes things a little easier
> for the attacker.  Removing the address of selinux_enforcing from
> kallsyms doesn't stop the attack, it just makes the attacker work
> a little harder.
Yes, we do not need write access to /proc/kallsyms.

> Note that the modified exploit that uses kallsyms to find the address
> of vmsplice and then opens /dev/kmem read/write to do its work would
> be stopped by SELinux.
Default xguest_t does not allow execution of program on /home
so, exploit program can not be executed.
I tried exploit with boolean allow_xguest_exec_content on.

However, in this case, 
it is easy to guess address of selinux_enforcing,
because the address of selinux_enforcing is the same in another machine,
as long as the same kernel binary is used.


> 
>  - todd

Regards,
Yuichi Nakamura

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