Re: [RFC][PATCH] selinux: support 64-bit capabilities

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Stephen Smalley wrote:
On Wed, 2008-02-06 at 11:22 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
64-bit capability support has gone into mainline.
Update SELinux to correctly handle 64-bit capabilities.

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e5ed075..fa4b021 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1278,6 +1278,8 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	u16 sclass;
+	u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);	
tsec = tsk->security; @@ -1285,8 +1287,17 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	ad.tsk = tsk;
 	ad.u.cap = cap;
- return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
-			    SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
+	switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
+	case 0:
+		sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EPERM;

Should likely make this something like:
	printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown capability %d\n", cap);
	if (selinux_enforcing)
		return -EPERM;
	else
		return 0;

Then, if/when people introduce capabilities without updating SELinux,
we'll get a warning but permissive mode will allow the operation to
proceed.


Are we going to do some magic in the toolchain to treat caps as 1 class in source policy but split it up in binary? I remember that being a possibility at some point.




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