On Wed, 6 Feb 2008, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>
> > + switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
> > + case 0:
> > + sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
> > + break;
> > + case 1:
> > + sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + return -EPERM;
>
> Should likely make this something like:
> printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown capability %d\n", cap);
> if (selinux_enforcing)
> return -EPERM;
> else
> return 0;
>
> Then, if/when people introduce capabilities without updating SELinux,
> we'll get a warning but permissive mode will allow the operation to
> proceed.
Agreed, perhaps also suggest upgrading policy in the message.
>
> > + }
> > + return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
> > }
> >
> > /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
> > index 399f868..d569669 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
> > +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
> > @@ -132,6 +132,9 @@
> > S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__LEASE, "lease")
> > S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__AUDIT_WRITE, "audit_write")
> > S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__AUDIT_CONTROL, "audit_control")
> > + S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETFCAP, "setfcap")
> > + S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2, CAPABILITY2__MAC_OVERRIDE, "mac_override")
> > + S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2, CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN, "mac_admin")
> > S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
> > S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
> > S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
> > index 84c9abc..75b4131 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
> > +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
> > @@ -533,6 +533,9 @@
> > #define CAPABILITY__LEASE 0x10000000UL
> > #define CAPABILITY__AUDIT_WRITE 0x20000000UL
> > #define CAPABILITY__AUDIT_CONTROL 0x40000000UL
> > +#define CAPABILITY__SETFCAP 0x80000000UL
> > +#define CAPABILITY2__MAC_OVERRIDE 0x00000001UL
> > +#define CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN 0x00000002UL
> > #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
> > #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
> > #define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
> > index b1b0d1d..bd813c3 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
> > +++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
> > @@ -71,3 +71,4 @@
> > S_(NULL)
> > S_(NULL)
> > S_("peer")
> > + S_("capability2")
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
> > index 09e9dd2..febf886 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
> > +++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
> > @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
> > #define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET 60
> > #define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT 61
> > #define SECCLASS_PEER 68
> > +#define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 69
> >
> > /*
> > * Security identifier indices for initial entities
> >
>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
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