-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Here is an update selinux patch for sudo potentially for rawhide. I have updated selinux policy to work with it. A lot of it was copied from newrole. So now you can execute # grep dwalsh /etc/sudoers dwalsh ALL=(ALL) ALL $ id -Z staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0 # sudo -r unconfined_r -t unconfined_t id -Z staff_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0 # sudo -r webadm_r -t webadm_t id -Z staff_u:webadm_r:webadm_t:s0 $ sudo -r unconfined_r -t unconfined_t sh # /usr/sbin/semanage user -l | grep staff_u staff_u staff s0 s0-s0:c0.c1023 system_r sysadm_r staff_r unconfined_r webadm_r $ sudo -r webadm_r -t webadm_t sh # /sbin/service httpd start Starting httpd: [ OK ] # ps -eZ | grep http staff_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 11870 ? 00:00:00 httpd staff_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 11872 ? 00:00:00 httpd staff_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 11874 ? 00:00:00 httpd staff_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 11875 ? 00:00:00 httpd staff_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 11876 ? 00:00:00 httpd staff_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 11877 ? 00:00:00 httpd staff_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 11878 ? 00:00:00 httpd staff_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 11879 ? 00:00:00 httpd staff_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 11880 ? 00:00:00 httpd # /sbin/service ntp start ntp: unrecognized service # touch /dan.html touch: cannot touch `/dan.html': Permission denied # touch /var/www/html/dan.html # ls # ls -lZ /var/www/html/dan.html - -rw-r--r--+ root root staff_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t:s0 /var/www/html/dan.html With this patch and the correct selinux policy(rawhide), I can do everything I want with sudo, for RBAC controls. The problem is the administrator needs to know the correct commands to enter to select the correct roles. I would rather put this in the sudoers file. So what would be the correct context to say when dwalsh runs any app the shell he starts is running webadm_r:webadm_t? One controversial part of the sudo patch is the addition of a new shell /usr/sbin/sesh. This shell is only to make sure all transitions happen properly. So the role/type selected apply to a shell and not to the command entered on the sudo line. This prevents the admin from executing sudo -r webadm_r -t webadm_t rpm -i ... And rpm running as webadm_t instead of doing a transition to rpm_t. (if webadm_t has a transition to rpm_t). We could force this to always use /bin/bash but there could be problems there. And not all shells work the same way, so potentially using the login shell could cause problems. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAkegj0MACgkQrlYvE4MpobM7XACgg1uIbEGvNaTSNzpGYEw04kMN lIIAnjpjW3I5UtSs9HfyKdyucDCgSApT =8aRF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff -up sudo-1.6.9p4/configure.in.selinux sudo-1.6.9p4/configure.in
--- sudo-1.6.9p4/configure.in.selinux 2008-01-29 15:25:02.000000000 -0500
+++ sudo-1.6.9p4/configure.in 2008-01-29 15:25:02.000000000 -0500
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ dnl
dnl Initial values for Makefile variables listed above
dnl May be overridden by environment variables..
dnl
-PROGS="sudo visudo"
+PROGS="sudo visudo sesh"
: ${MANTYPE='man'}
: ${mansrcdir='.'}
: ${SUDOERS_MODE='0440'}
diff -up /dev/null sudo-1.6.9p4/selinux.c
--- /dev/null 2008-01-29 07:07:11.771655674 -0500
+++ sudo-1.6.9p4/selinux.c 2008-01-29 15:34:17.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ * Borrowed heavily from newrole source code
+ * Authors:
+ * Anthony Colatrella
+ * Tim Fraser
+ * Steve Grubb <sgrubb@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Darrel Goeddel <DGoeddel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Michael Thompson <mcthomps@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Dan Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ */
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <config.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <stddef.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# endif
+#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
+#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
+# if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_H) && !defined(STDC_HEADERS)
+# include <memory.h>
+# endif
+# include <string.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+# include <strings.h>
+# endif
+#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+# include <unistd.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+#include <libaudit.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "sudo.h"
+
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_AUDIT
+#include <libaudit.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <selinux/flask.h> /* for SECCLASS_CHR_FILE */
+#include <selinux/selinux.h> /* for is_selinux_enabled() */
+#include <selinux/context.h> /* for context-mangling functions */
+#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+
+/**
+ * This function attempts to revert the relabeling done to the tty.
+ * fd - referencing the opened ttyn
+ * ttyn - name of tty to restore
+ * tty_context - original context of the tty
+ * new_tty_context - context tty was relabeled to
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success, non-zero otherwise
+ */
+static int restore_tty_label(int fd, const char *ttyn,
+ security_context_t tty_context,
+ security_context_t new_tty_context)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ security_context_t chk_tty_context = NULL;
+
+ if (!ttyn)
+ goto skip_relabel;
+
+ if (!new_tty_context)
+ goto skip_relabel;
+
+ /* Verify that the tty still has the context set by newrole. */
+ if ((rc = fgetfilecon(fd, &chk_tty_context)) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not fgetfilecon %s.\n", ttyn);
+ goto skip_relabel;
+ }
+
+ if ((rc = strcmp(chk_tty_context, new_tty_context))) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s changed labels.\n", ttyn);
+ goto skip_relabel;
+ }
+
+ if ((rc = fsetfilecon(fd, tty_context)) < 0)
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Warning! Could not restore context for %s\n", ttyn);
+ skip_relabel:
+ freecon(chk_tty_context);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * This function attempts to relabel the tty. If this function fails, then
+ * the fd is closed, the contexts are free'd and -1 is returned. On success,
+ * a valid fd is returned and tty_context and new_tty_context are set.
+ *
+ * This function will not fail if it can not relabel the tty when selinux is
+ * in permissive mode.
+ */
+static int relabel_tty(const char *ttyn, security_context_t new_context,
+ security_context_t * tty_context,
+ security_context_t * new_tty_context)
+{
+ int fd;
+ int enforcing = security_getenforce();
+ security_context_t tty_con = NULL;
+ security_context_t new_tty_con = NULL;
+
+ if (!ttyn)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (enforcing < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not determine enforcing mode.\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Re-open TTY descriptor */
+ fd = open(ttyn, O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error! Could not open %s.\n", ttyn);
+ return fd;
+ }
+ fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK);
+
+ if (fgetfilecon(fd, &tty_con) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s! Could not get current context "
+ "for %s, not relabeling tty.\n",
+ enforcing ? "Error" : "Warning", ttyn);
+ if (enforcing)
+ goto close_fd;
+ }
+
+ if (tty_con &&
+ (security_compute_relabel(new_context, tty_con,
+ SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_con) < 0)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s! Could not get new context for %s, "
+ "not relabeling tty.\n",
+ enforcing ? "Error" : "Warning", ttyn);
+ if (enforcing)
+ goto close_fd;
+ }
+
+ if (new_tty_con)
+ if (fsetfilecon(fd, new_tty_con) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s! Could not set new context for %s\n",
+ enforcing ? "Error" : "Warning", ttyn);
+ freecon(new_tty_con);
+ new_tty_con = NULL;
+ if (enforcing)
+ goto close_fd;
+ }
+
+ *tty_context = tty_con;
+ *new_tty_context = new_tty_con;
+ return fd;
+
+ close_fd:
+ freecon(tty_con);
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+security_context_t get_exec_context(security_context_t old_context, char *role_s, char *type_s) {
+
+ /* our target security ID ("sid") */
+ security_context_t new_context=NULL;
+
+ /* manipulatable form of context_s */
+ context_t context;
+
+ if( !role_s ) {
+ fprintf(stderr,"You must specify a role.\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+
+ /*
+ * Get the SID and context of the caller, and extract
+ * the username from the context. Don't rely on the Linux
+ * uid information - it isn't trustworthy.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Create a context structure so that we extract and modify
+ * components easily.
+ */
+ context=context_new(old_context);
+
+ /*
+ *
+ * Step 3: Construct a new SID based on our old SID and the
+ * arguments specified on the command line.
+ *
+ */
+
+ /* The first step in constructing a new SID for the new shell we *
+ * plan to exec is to take our old context in `context' as a *
+ * starting point, and modify it according to the options the user *
+ * specified on the command line. */
+
+ /* If the user specified a new role on the command line (if `role_s' *
+ * is set), then replace the old role in `context' with this new role. */
+ if( !type_s ) {
+ if( get_default_type(role_s,&type_s) )
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"Couldn't get default type.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if( context_role_set(context,role_s)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,"failed to set new role %s\n",role_s);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If the user specified a new type on the command line (if `type_s' *
+ * is set), then replace the old type in `context' with this new type. */
+ if( type_s ) {
+ if( context_type_set(context,type_s)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,"failed to set new type %s\n",type_s);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } /* if user specified new type */
+
+ /* The second step in creating the new SID is to convert our modified *
+ * `context' structure back to a context string and then to a SID. */
+
+ /* Make `context_s' point to a string version of the new `context'. */
+ if( !(new_context=strdup(context_str(context)))) {
+ fprintf(stderr,"failed to convert new context to string\n" );
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (security_check_context(new_context) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a valid context\n", new_context);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ printf("Your new context is %s\n",new_context);
+#endif
+
+ context_free(context);
+ return new_context;
+
+ err:
+ context_free(context);
+ freecon(new_context);
+ return NULL;
+
+}
+
+void selinux_exec(char *role_s, char *type_s, char *safe_cmd, int NewArgc, char **NewArgv, char **environ){
+ pid_t childPid = 0;
+ int ttyfd = -1;
+ /* our original securiy ID ("old_context") */
+ security_context_t old_context=NULL;
+
+ /* security context to change to while running command*/
+ security_context_t new_tty_context=NULL;
+ /* current security context of tty */
+ security_context_t tty_context=NULL;
+
+ char *ttyn = NULL; /* tty path */
+
+ /* our target security ID ("sid") */
+ security_context_t new_context=NULL;
+ /* Put the caller's SID into `old_context'. */
+ if (getprevcon(&old_context)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,"failed to get old_context.\n");
+ exit(-1);
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ printf( "Your old context was %s\n", old_context );
+#endif
+ new_context=get_exec_context(old_context, role_s,type_s);
+ if (! new_context) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not set exec context to %s.\n", new_context);
+ exit(-1);
+ }
+
+ ttyn = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO);
+ if (!ttyn || *ttyn == '\0') {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Warning! Could not retrieve tty information.\n");
+ }
+
+ ttyfd = relabel_tty(ttyn, new_context, &tty_context, &new_tty_context);
+ if (ttyfd < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not setup tty context for %s.\n", new_context);
+ exit(-1);
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ printf("Your old tty context is %s\n",tty_context);
+ printf("Your new tty context is %s\n",new_tty_context);
+#endif
+
+
+ childPid = fork();
+ if (childPid < 0) {
+ /* fork failed, no child to worry about */
+ int errsv = errno;
+ fprintf(stderr, "newrole: failure forking: %s",
+ strerror(errsv));
+ if (restore_tty_label(ttyfd, ttyn, tty_context, new_tty_context))
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unable to restore tty label...\n");
+ if (close(ttyfd))
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to close tty properly\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else if (childPid) {
+ /* PARENT
+ * It doesn't make senes to exit early on errors at this point,
+ * since we are doing cleanup which needs to be done.
+ * We can exit with a bad rc though
+ */
+ pid_t pid;
+ int exit_code = 0;
+ int status;
+
+ do {
+ pid = wait(&status);
+ } while (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+
+ /* Preserve child exit status, unless there is another error. */
+ if (WIFEXITED(status))
+ exit_code = WEXITSTATUS(status);
+
+ if (restore_tty_label(ttyfd, ttyn, tty_context, new_tty_context)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unable to restore tty label...\n");
+ exit_code = -1;
+ }
+ freecon(tty_context);
+ freecon(new_tty_context);
+ if (close(ttyfd)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to close tty properly\n");
+ exit_code = -1;
+ }
+ exit(exit_code);
+ }
+ /* CHILD */
+ /* Close the tty and reopen descriptors 0 through 2 */
+ if (ttyn) {
+ if (close(ttyfd) || close(0) || close(1) || close(2)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not close descriptors.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ttyfd = open(ttyn, O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
+ if (ttyfd != 0)
+ goto err;
+ fcntl(ttyfd, F_SETFL, fcntl(ttyfd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK);
+ ttyfd = open(ttyn, O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK);
+ if (ttyfd != 1)
+ goto err;
+ fcntl(ttyfd, F_SETFL, fcntl(ttyfd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK);
+ ttyfd = open(ttyn, O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK);
+ if (ttyfd != 2)
+ goto err;
+ fcntl(ttyfd, F_SETFL, fcntl(ttyfd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK);
+ }
+ if (setexeccon(new_context)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not set exec context to %s.\n",
+ new_context);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef USE_AUDIT
+ if (send_audit_message(1, old_context, new_context, ttyn))
+ goto err;
+#endif
+
+ {
+ /*
+ SELinux will only not transition properly with the following
+ code. Basically if the user chooses to use a different security
+ context. We need to start the selinux shell, before executing
+ the command. This way the process transition will happen
+ correctly. For example if they user wants to run rpm from
+ sysadm_r. Sudo will exec the /usr/sbin/sesh followed by the
+ specified command.*/
+ char **dst, **src = NewArgv+1;
+ NewArgv = (char **) emalloc2((++NewArgc + 1), sizeof(char *));
+ NewArgv[0] = estrdup("/usr/sbin/sesh");
+ NewArgv[1] = safe_cmd;
+ safe_cmd = estrdup("/usr/sbin/sesh");
+ /* copy the args from Argv */
+ for (dst = NewArgv + 2; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst)
+ ;
+ }
+ freecon(old_context);
+ freecon(new_context);
+
+ execve(safe_cmd, NewArgv, environ); /* run the command */
+
+ perror("failed to exec shell\n");
+ err:
+ freecon(old_context);
+ freecon(new_context);
+ exit(-1);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
diff -up /dev/null sudo-1.6.9p4/sesh.c
--- /dev/null 2008-01-29 07:07:11.771655674 -0500
+++ sudo-1.6.9p4/sesh.c 2008-01-29 15:25:02.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+main (int argc, char **argv) {
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
+ pid_t pid;
+ if ( argc < 2 ) {
+ fprintf(stderr,"%s: Requires at least one argument\n", argv[0]);
+ exit(-1);
+ }
+
+ if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s: Couldn't fork",argv[0]);
+ perror(buf);
+ exit(-1);
+ } else if (pid > 0) {
+ /* Parent */
+ int status;
+ int ret;
+
+ do {
+ if ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) < 0 && errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ else if (ret < 0) {
+ perror("waitpid failed");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ } while (0);
+
+ if (WIFEXITED(status))
+ exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ else
+ exit(1);
+ } else {
+ /* Child */
+ execv(argv[1], &argv[1]);
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s: Error execing %s", argv[0], argv[1]);
+ perror(buf);
+ exit(-1);
+ }
+}
diff -up sudo-1.6.9p4/sudo.man.in.selinux sudo-1.6.9p4/sudo.man.in
--- sudo-1.6.9p4/sudo.man.in.selinux 2007-08-15 10:16:58.000000000 -0400
+++ sudo-1.6.9p4/sudo.man.in 2008-01-29 15:25:02.000000000 -0500
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ sudo, sudoedit \- execute a command as a
.PP
\&\fBsudo\fR [\fB\-bEHPS\fR] [\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR]
[\fB\-c\fR\ \fIclass\fR|\fI\-\fR] [\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR] [\fB\-u\fR\ \fIusername\fR|\fI#uid\fR]
+[\fB\-r\fR \fIrole\fR ] [\fB\-t\fR \fItype\fR ]
[\fB\s-1VAR\s0\fR=\fIvalue\fR] {\fB\-i\fR\ |\ \fB\-s\fR\ |\ \fIcommand\fR}
.PP
\&\fBsudoedit\fR [\fB\-S\fR] [\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR] [\fB\-c\fR\ \fIclass\fR|\fI\-\fR]
@@ -323,6 +324,16 @@ preserve the invoking user's group vecto
\&\fBsudo\fR will initialize the group vector to the list of groups the
target user is in. The real and effective group IDs, however, are
still set to match the target user.
+.IP "\-r" 4
+.IX Item "-r"
+The \fB\-r\fR (\fRrole\fR) option causes the new (SELinux) security context to have the role specified by
+\fIROLE\fR.
+.IP "\-t" 4
+.IX Item "-t"
+The \fB\-t\fR (\fRtype\fR) option causes the new (SELinux) security context to have the have the type (domain)
+specified by
+\fITYPE\fR.
+If no type is specified, the default type is derived from the specified role.
.IP "\-p" 4
.IX Item "-p"
The \fB\-p\fR (\fIprompt\fR) option allows you to override the default
diff -up sudo-1.6.9p4/Makefile.in.selinux sudo-1.6.9p4/Makefile.in
--- sudo-1.6.9p4/Makefile.in.selinux 2008-01-29 15:25:02.000000000 -0500
+++ sudo-1.6.9p4/Makefile.in 2008-01-29 15:25:02.000000000 -0500
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ INSTALL = $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/install-sh
# Libraries
LIBS = @LIBS@
NET_LIBS = @NET_LIBS@
-SUDO_LIBS = @SUDO_LIBS@ @AFS_LIBS@ $(LIBS) $(NET_LIBS)
+SELINUX_LIBS = -lselinux
+SUDO_LIBS = @SUDO_LIBS@ @AFS_LIBS@ $(LIBS) $(NET_LIBS) $(SELINUX_LIBS)
# C preprocessor flags
CPPFLAGS = -I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ sudoers_gid = @SUDOERS_GID@
sudoers_mode = @SUDOERS_MODE@
# Pass in paths and uid/gid + OS dependent defined
-DEFS = @OSDEFS@ -D_PATH_SUDOERS=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers\" -D_PATH_SUDOERS_TMP=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers.tmp\" -DSUDOERS_UID=$(sudoers_uid) -DSUDOERS_GID=$(sudoers_gid) -DSUDOERS_MODE=$(sudoers_mode)
+DEFS = @OSDEFS@ -D_PATH_SUDOERS=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers\" -D_PATH_SUDOERS_TMP=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers.tmp\" -DSUDOERS_UID=$(sudoers_uid) -DSUDOERS_GID=$(sudoers_gid) -DSUDOERS_MODE=$(sudoers_mode) -DWITH_SELINUX
#### End of system configuration section. ####
@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ SRCS = alloc.c alloca.c check.c closefro
logging.c memrchr.c mkstemp.c parse.c parse.lex parse.yacc set_perms.c \
sigaction.c snprintf.c strcasecmp.c strerror.c strlcat.c strlcpy.c \
sudo.c sudo_noexec.c sudo.tab.c sudo_edit.c testsudoers.c tgetpass.c \
- utimes.c visudo.c zero_bytes.c $(AUTH_SRCS)
+ utimes.c visudo.c zero_bytes.c $(AUTH_SRCS) selinux.c sesh.c
AUTH_SRCS = auth/afs.c auth/aix_auth.c auth/bsdauth.c auth/dce.c auth/fwtk.c \
auth/kerb4.c auth/kerb5.c auth/pam.c auth/passwd.c auth/rfc1938.c \
@@ -123,11 +124,13 @@ AUDIT_OBJS = audit_help.o
PARSEOBJS = sudo.tab.o lex.yy.o alloc.o defaults.o
SUDOBJS = check.o env.o getspwuid.o gettime.o goodpath.o fileops.o find_path.o \
- interfaces.o logging.o parse.o set_perms.o sudo.o sudo_edit.o \
+ interfaces.o logging.o parse.o set_perms.o sudo.o selinux.o sudo_edit.o \
tgetpass.o zero_bytes.o @SUDO_OBJS@ $(AUTH_OBJS) $(PARSEOBJS) $(AUDIT_OBJS)
VISUDOBJS = visudo.o fileops.o gettime.o goodpath.o find_path.o $(PARSEOBJS)
+SESH_OBJS = sesh.o
+
TESTOBJS = interfaces.o testsudoers.o $(PARSEOBJS)
LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ @ALLOCA@
@@ -148,7 +151,7 @@ DISTFILES = $(SRCS) $(HDRS) BUGS CHANGES
BINFILES= BUGS CHANGES HISTORY LICENSE README TODO TROUBLESHOOTING \
UPGRADE install-sh mkinstalldirs sample.syslog.conf sample.sudoers \
sudo sudo.cat sudo.man sudo.pod sudoers sudoers.cat sudoers.man \
- sudoers.pod visudo visudo.cat visudo.man visudo.pod
+ sudoers.pod visudo visudo.cat visudo.man visudo.pod sesh
BINSPECIAL= INSTALL.binary Makefile.binary libtool
@@ -180,6 +183,9 @@ sudo: $(SUDOBJS) $(LIBOBJS)
visudo: $(VISUDOBJS) $(LIBOBJS)
$(CC) -o $@ $(VISUDOBJS) $(LIBOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) $(NET_LIBS)
+sesh: $(SESH_OBJS)
+ $(CC) -o $@ $(SESH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
testsudoers: $(TESTOBJS) $(LIBOBJS)
$(CC) -o $@ $(TESTOBJS) $(LIBOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) $(NET_LIBS)
@@ -221,6 +227,7 @@ logging.o: logging.c $(SUDODEP)
set_perms.o: set_perms.c $(SUDODEP)
tgetpass.o: tgetpass.c $(SUDODEP)
visudo.o: visudo.c $(SUDODEP) version.h
+sesh.o: sesh.c
sudo.o: sudo.c $(SUDODEP) interfaces.h version.h
interfaces.o: interfaces.c $(SUDODEP) interfaces.h
testsudoers.o: testsudoers.c $(SUDODEP) parse.h interfaces.h
@@ -319,6 +326,7 @@ install-binaries: $(PROGS)
ln $(DESTDIR)$(sudodir)/sudo $(DESTDIR)$(sudodir)/sudoedit
$(INSTALL) -O $(install_uid) -G $(install_gid) -M 0111 -s visudo $(DESTDIR)$(visudodir)/visudo
+ $(INSTALL) -O $(install_uid) -G $(install_gid) -M 0111 -s sesh $(DESTDIR)$(visudodir)/sesh
install-noexec: sudo_noexec.la
$(LIBTOOL) --mode=install $(INSTALL) sudo_noexec.la $(DESTDIR)$(noexecdir)
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sudo-1.6.9p4-selinux.patch.sig
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