On Fri, 2008-01-18 at 10:38 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: > --- Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > On Fri, 2008-01-18 at 08:40 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > > I was looking in selinux_inode_setsecurity for my own > > > neffarious purposes and was curious what prevents a program > > > that has a file open from setting the context on the file > > > using fsetxattr. I confess that I haven't tried it to see > > > how it actually behaves. > > > > Sorry, what's your question? Of course you can relabel a file via > > fsetxattr (if you pass the permission check, which is a different hook > > called earlier). > > In the case of fsetxattr, which hook would that be? All three setxattr system calls ultimately call vfs_setxattr(), which calls security_inode_setxattr() to check security module permissions. If it passes that check, then it proceeds to the actual processing, which follows different paths depending on whether the fs implements a setxattr operation or not. security_inode_setsecurity() is just the low level primitive for setting the value in the in-core security structure and can be called either from the vfs (as the fallback) or from the individual fs op (as in tmpfs). Originally only the latter before the vfs fallbacks were introduced. -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
