Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]

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On Tue, 2008-01-15 at 16:03 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> > >  (3) Check that the kernel may create files as a particular secid (this
> > >      could be specified indirectly by specifying an inode, which would
> > >      hide the secid inside the LSM).
> > 
> > I don't think this check is on the kernel per se but rather the ability
> > of the daemon to nominate a secid for use on files created later by the
> > kernel module.
> 
> Hmmm...  At the moment the cachefiles module works out for itself what the
> file label should be by looking at the root directory it was given and
> assuming the label on that is what it's going to be using.  Are you suggesting
> this should be specified directly instead by the daemon?

No, just that however the secid is determined (whether indirectly via
specification of a directory or directly via specification of a secid),
the ability of the daemon to control what secid gets used ought to be
controlled.  Or, alternatively, the ability of the daemon to enable
caching in a given directory ought to be controlled.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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