with CAP_SYS_ADMIN being bloated, the usefulness of using it to
flag a process to be entrusted for e.g reading and writing trusted
xattr is near zero.
CAP_TRUSTED aims to provide userland with a way to mark a process as
entrusted to do specific (not specially admin-centered) actions. It
would for example allow a process to red/write the trusted xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 5 +++--
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index ce230aa6d928..27e457b93c84 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -369,7 +369,11 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
#define CAP_SYS_MOUNT 38
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_MOUNT
+/* Allow read/write trusted xattr */
+
+#define CAP_TRUSTED 39
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_TRUSTED
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index a873dce97fd5..f5dc8e109f5a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -24,9 +24,10 @@
"audit_control", "setfcap"
#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
- "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_mount"
+ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_mount", \
+ "trusted"
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_MOUNT
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_TRUSTED
#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
#endif
--
2.14.2
--
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