On Sun, Apr 05 2015 at 1:20pm -0400, Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > This patch series increase security of suspend and hibernate actions. It allows > user to safely wipe crypto keys before suspend and hibernate actions starts > without race conditions on userspace process with heavy I/O. > > To automatically wipe cryto key for <device> before hibernate action call: > $ dmsetup message <device> 0 key wipe_on_hibernation 1 > > To automatically wipe cryto key for <device> before suspend action call: > $ dmsetup message <device> 0 key wipe_on_suspend 1 > > (Value 0 after wipe_* string reverts original behaviour - to not wipe key) Can you elaborate on the attack vector your changes are meant to protect against? The user already authorized access, why is it inherently dangerous to _not_ wipe the associated key across these events? -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-raid" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
