The dm-raid1 module also appears to intrinsicly trust its mapping and the
contents of its meta-data (simple magic number check). It seems to me that the kernel should validate all of its inputs regardless of whether the
ioctls that are used to present them are only supposed to be used by a
"trusted daemon".
The kernel should not be validating -trusted- userland inputs. Root is allowed to scrag the disk, violate limits, and/or crash his own machine.
A simple example is requiring userland, when submitting ATA taskfiles via an ioctl, to specify the data phase (pio read, dma write, no-data, etc.). If the data phase is specified incorrectly, you kill the OS driver's ATA host state machine, and the results are very unpredictable. Since this is a trusted operation, requiring CAP_RAW_IO, it's up to userland to get the required details right (just like following a spec).
I honestly don't care if the final solution is EMD, DM, or XYZ so long as that solution is correct, supportable, and covers all of the scenarios required for robust RAID support. That is the crux of the argument, not "please love my code".
hehe. I think we all agree here...
Jeff
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