Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver

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On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 02:55:33AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote:
> Since the thread has become a bit divergent I wanted to note that we
> have offered a proposal for a general policy management framework
> based on MRSIGNER values.  This framework is consistent with the SGX
> security model, ie. cryptographic rather then DAC based policy
> controls.  This framework also allows a much more flexible policy
> implementation that doesn't result in combinatoric issues.
> 
> Our framework also allows the preservation of the current ABI which
> allows an EINITTOKEN to be passed in from userspace.  The framework
> also supports the ability to specify that only a kernel based launch
> enclave (LE) should be available if the platform owner or distribution
> should desire to implement such a model.
> 
> The policy management framework is straight forward.  Three linked
> lists or their equivalent which are populated through /sysfs
> pseudo-files or equivalent plumbing.  Each list is populated with
> MRSIGNER values for signing keys that are allowed to initialize
> enclaves under three separate conditions.
> 
> 1.) General enclaves without special attribute bits.
> 
> 2.) Enclaves with the SGX_FLAGS_PROVISION_KEY attribute set. - i.e.,
> 'Provisioning Enclaves'.
> 
> 3.) Enclaves with the SGX_FLAGS_LICENSE_KEY attribute set - i.e., 'Launch
> Enclaves'.
> 
> An all-null MRSIGNER value serves as a 'sealing' value that locks a
> list from any further modifications.
> 
> This architecture allows platform policies to be specified and then
> sealed at early boot by the root user.  At that point cryptographic
> policy controls are in place rather then DAC based controls, the
> latter of which have perpetual security liabilities in addition to the
> useability constraints inherent in a DAC or device node model.
> 
> We have developed an independent implementation of the PSW and
> arguably have as much experience with issues surrounding how to
> interact with the device driver as anyone.  We have spent a lot of
> time thinking about these issues and the above framework provides the
> most flexible architecture available.

Sounds like a lot bloat and policy added to the kernel whereas with
Andy's proposal you can implement logic to a daemon and provide only
mechanism to do it.

/Jarkko



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