Bill Moran schrieb:
Scott Marlowe <scott.marlowe@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Fri, Jul 24, 2009 at 5:02 PM, Brian A.
Seklecki<lavalamp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
All:
Any suggestions on how-to, or comments on a potential NFR, to disable
non-superuser's from viewing the database list via \l?
So, is this a misguided attempt at security through obscurity, or are
you looking at limiting the noise that users see when they look at
databases?
I don't know about misguided, Scott. Security takes many forms.
If a client wants shared database hosting, but wants an assurance that
other clients using the same shared DB server can't tell who else is
using it?
It's not security in the strict computer-science definition. Obviously,
if the proper ownerships and grants don't exist to protect the data, in
addition to said obscurity, then the whole thing is pointless. But such
obscurity _in_addition_ to proper, real security, has show usefulness
in many areas.
Take a properly secured SSH server, for example, and move it to an obscure
port #. Now you've reduced the number of mindless bots looking for
unprotected root accounts, and your IDS solution that monitors the ssh
logs is actually useful. Of course, that's only effective if ssh is
properly secured to begin with.
Similar concept.
Many clients want the cost-effectiveness of shared DB hosting. Many of
them also want it kept under wraps that they're doing so. The provider
that can do such a thing gets the contract. Those that complain about
"it's not security, it's obscurity" do not get the contract.
I mean, didn't Apple just kill someone for letting their new iPhone
design leak?
this is now going off topic - but what do you mean with your last sentence?
Cheers
Andy
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