Scott Marlowe <scott.marlowe@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Fri, Jul 24, 2009 at 5:02 PM, Brian A. > Seklecki<lavalamp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > All: > > > > Any suggestions on how-to, or comments on a potential NFR, to disable > > non-superuser's from viewing the database list via \l? > > So, is this a misguided attempt at security through obscurity, or are > you looking at limiting the noise that users see when they look at > databases? I don't know about misguided, Scott. Security takes many forms. If a client wants shared database hosting, but wants an assurance that other clients using the same shared DB server can't tell who else is using it? It's not security in the strict computer-science definition. Obviously, if the proper ownerships and grants don't exist to protect the data, in addition to said obscurity, then the whole thing is pointless. But such obscurity _in_addition_ to proper, real security, has show usefulness in many areas. Take a properly secured SSH server, for example, and move it to an obscure port #. Now you've reduced the number of mindless bots looking for unprotected root accounts, and your IDS solution that monitors the ssh logs is actually useful. Of course, that's only effective if ssh is properly secured to begin with. Similar concept. Many clients want the cost-effectiveness of shared DB hosting. Many of them also want it kept under wraps that they're doing so. The provider that can do such a thing gets the contract. Those that complain about "it's not security, it's obscurity" do not get the contract. I mean, didn't Apple just kill someone for letting their new iPhone design leak? -- Bill Moran http://www.potentialtech.com -- Sent via pgsql-general mailing list (pgsql-general@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-general
