After years of administering single-site PostgreSQL, I'm finally getting started on a PostgreSQL hosting project. I just wanted to check to see how our approach jives with what other folks in the community have done. Much of this is derived from the "hardening" techniques derived from phpPgAdmin.patch: Here is an excerpt from our current pg_hba.conf: pg_hba.conf # allow users to connect to database of same name, from network, with password host sameuser all 192.168.1.0/24 md5 # postgres connect from network with password host all postgres 192.168.1.0/24 md5 As far as I can tell, this solves 80% of the problem. Now users are restricted to databases corresponding to their usernames. The only difficulty seems to be unrestricted access to cluster-wide system catalogs. So, in order to restrict access to the system catalogs, we do the following (where all connections are performed as user postgres and dbuser is the example name of a user/database): # all connections as user postgres template1=# create database dbuser; template1=# revoke all privileges on database dbuser from public; dbuser=# create or replace view pg_db as select oid, * from pg_database where datname=(select current_user); dbuser=# grant select on pg_db to public; dbuser=# revoke select on pg_database from public; dbuser=# create or replace view pg_grp as select * from pg_group where groname=(select current_user); dbuser=# grant select on pg_grp to public; dbuser=# revoke select on pg_group from public; dbuser=# create or replace view pg_user as select usename, usesysid, usecreatedb, usesuper, usecatupd, '********'::text as passwd, valuntil, useconfig FROM pg_shadow where usename=(select current_user); dbuser=# grant select on pg_user to public; dbuser=# grant select on public.pg_user to public; dbuser=# revoke all privileges on schema public from public; template1=# create user dbuser with 'changeme'; template1=# grant all privileges on database dbuser to dbuser; template1=# alter database dbuser owner to dbuser; dbuser=# grant all on schema public to dbuser; If we ever needed to remove a user/database, it should be as easy as: dropdb dbuser dropuser dbuser As far as I can tell, this pretty well locks down anyone accessing the database through allowed interfaces into the databases they own and prevents them from accessing or modifying any other databases. Otherwise, we'll be letting users use phpPgAdmin to administer their databases. In phpPgAdmin, setting $conf['owned_only'] = true allows one to restrict the display of databases to those owned by the user who is logged in, but this setting does nothing to prevent arbitrary SQL being run to access and modify databases and tables not owned by the current user. Even though the above settings serve to fulfill this function, we still decided to set this. Is this idiomatic? Is this in the realm of best practices? Am I missing anything? Are there any less intrusive ways of doing things? Am I hurting my prospects for upgrade paths? There were a few minor patches made to phpPgAdmin, for instance, to get it to use the new pb_db view. -- Thomas F. O'Connell Co-Founder, Information Architect Sitening, LLC Strategic Open Source: Open Your i™ 110 30th Avenue North, Suite 6 Nashville, TN 37203-6320 615-260-0005 |
