> From: Michael R. Hines [mailto:mrhines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] > Sent: Friday, July 27, 2018 07:48 > > > On 07/27/2018 08:35 AM, Michael Wojcik wrote: > > > > (I'm only commenting on TLBleed here because I'm not sure what you > > mean by "non-constant-time attack". TLBleed isn't a timing side channel, so > > what does constant time have to do with the question?) > > The paper is in fact based on a timing attack. Both Intel (and a nice > blog from Redhat) confirm this; In fact that's the only way this > particular vulnerability works. It leaks bits by observing the branch > path of the code referencing each bit while processing a private key > based on the time it takes to hit/miss a lookup in the TLB. Oh, yes, of course you're correct. Sorry - that's what I get for responding early in the morning. > If the > cryptographic implementation is constant-time, then the bits are not > discoverable and the attack is then unavailable. Hmm. I suppose this is true, but it's not the usual sense of "constant time" when referring to cryptographic implementations - that is, it's not constant-time explicit operations (arithmetic, etc) but constant-time memory access, which requires the implementation to predict which pages it will touch, and to know something about the TLB algorithm used by the particular CPU it's running on. I think that goes back to the TLBleed authors' mention of partitioning the target process virtual address space. For a library, that would be difficult, since it receives the key at an arbitrary address from the application. > We're trying to decide if we can avoid disabling hyperthreading, as our > measurements show that the performance losses (even with integer > workloads) are significant. > > Might anyone be able to comment on this particular type of attack in > OpenSSL? Certainly I'd need to do a lot more research before I'd feel comfortable speculating about possible mitigations within OpenSSL. I'll be interested to see if anyone else does. -- Michael Wojcik Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus -- openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
