Re: Selection of DHE ciphers based on modulus size of DH

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Hello,
Thank you Matt and Jordan. So, it seems that it's possible to modify my client to accept/reject the DH group key length. But i have one more issue to be clarified.

Is it possible that if a client does not accept the DH group key length used by the server, then, a different possible cipher (for e.g., RSA) is tried to be negotiated. It seems that the connection is rejected, instead of falling back to a different possible cipher. At least, i tested this quickly using s_client and s_server, and the behavior is as stated above, i.e., no fallback and connection was terminated. Is this the default OpenSSL behavior or this behaviour could be modified somehow by applications ?

Regards,
Sanjaya

On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 8:43 PM, Matt Caswell <matt@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:


On 07/06/18 16:02, Jordan Brown wrote:
> I do not understand, however, how the 80 relates to a 1024-bit limit.

It's a measure of the "security bits" of an algorithm according to table
2 in this doc:
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-57pt1r4.pdf

Matt
--
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users

-- 
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Index of Archives]     [Linux ARM Kernel]     [Linux ARM]     [Linux Omap]     [Fedora ARM]     [IETF Annouce]     [Security]     [Bugtraq]     [Linux]     [Linux OMAP]     [Linux MIPS]     [ECOS]     [Asterisk Internet PBX]     [Linux API]

  Powered by Linux