FIPS mode restrictions and DES

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Thanks for the comments - much appreciated.

The following question might be on the naive side of things, but then I'm
all new to this.  Since crypt() in glibc2 supports SHA-256 and SHA-512 for
password, and assuming that these two are FIPS compatible, what would be the
(financial) overhead of having the crypto part of glibc2 go through
validation ?  It sounds very odd, not to mention very expensive, but I'm
asking nevertheless, in case there is a possibility.  In other words, is the
only practical and viable option regarding this to re-implement crypt()
using EVP methods ?  - thanks.

Regards.




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