Hi, On Fri, Apr 09, 2021 at 08:06:21AM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote: > > > Any caching of state is inherently insecure because any caches of limited > > > size can be always thrashed by a purposeful attacker. I suppose the > > > only thing that would work is to actually write something to the > > > executable itself on disk, but of course that doesn't always work either. > > > > I'm also working on this. In the next version I will try to find a way to > > prevent brute force attacks through the execve system call with more than > > one level of forking. > > Thanks. > > Thinking more about it what I wrote above wasn't quite right. The cache > would only need to be as big as the number of attackable services/suid > binaries. Presumably on many production systems that's rather small, > so a cache (which wouldn't actually be a cache, but a complete database) > might actually work. Thanks. I will keep it in mind. > > -Andi Regards, John Wood _______________________________________________ Kernelnewbies mailing list Kernelnewbies@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.kernelnewbies.org/mailman/listinfo/kernelnewbies
