RE: DROP TCP output to HTTP attackers?

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: netfilter-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
> [mailto:netfilter-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of 
> Derick Anderson
> Sent: Tuesday, December 27, 2005 11:31 AM
> To: netfilter
> Subject: RE: DROP TCP output to HTTP attackers?
> 
> 
>  
> [ snip ]
> 
> > > 
> > > My only comment would be that for proxy users (AOL, for 
> > instance) you 
> > > may end up dropping legitimate traffic. The risk/reward 
> of that is 
> > > something you'll have to determine for yourself.
> > > 
> > > Derick Anderson
> > > 
> > 
> > I must admit that I have little knowledge of these proxies.  
> > I infer from what you say that different users might present 
> > the same peer ip address.
> > Is this true?  If so, perhaps I should set a time limit on 
> the block.
> 
> Yes - there may be thousands of users on the same proxy. In my limited
> experience it's generally broadband users (and some universities) that
> have public IPs tied to a single account. Most others (businesses,
> dial-up ISPs) will go through a proxy or at least NAT to a 
> single public
> IP and many people use third-party proxies to surf anonymously.
> 
> If you're going to set a time limit, it should be real short, 
> like a few
> seconds. Most automated attacks take place in less than two or three
> seconds on a decent connection, from my experience. This 
> would limit the
> timeouts experienced by legitimate users.
>  
> > With regard to blocking output in response to attacks, 
> > thereby blocking TCP FIN, are there any opinoins on this?
> > 
> > Thanks for your help.
> > Mike.
> > 
> 
> Not sending the TCP FIN might be advantageous when coupled 
> with your IP
> dropping policy since legit clients may retry several times before
> giving up. Otherwise your advantage is no response (more stealthy for
> scans) vs. the disadvantage of more open connections which will wait a
> long time before closing.
> 
> Derick Anderson
> 
> 

The attacks I see most frequently are GETs for a large set of nonexistant
items.  They are easily recognized by the ip address rather than the domain
namein the Host: header.  In cases where I do allow the TCP FIN, (which I
have been doing for the last day or two), the attacker keeps trying for
10 or 15 minutes.

Mike.

--
Michael D. Berger
m.d.berger@xxxxxxxx 




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