On Fri, 22 May 2009, Jozsef Kadlecsik wrote:
> On Fri, 22 May 2009, Anatoly Muliarski wrote:
>
> > > This is the main problem: we can never be sure the packets which are seen
> > > by firewall do really reach the destination or they order is preserved.
>
> > We could save the LAST sequence number as a current one.
> > So we keep the connection and mark the current RST as invalid and
> > correctly react on the following ones. Unfortunately this does not
> > solve the main problem - unable to know whether the received sequence
> > number is valid or not. As an vague idea - we could track the ack
> > number from other direction and so keep the last delivered sequence
> > number. What can say about it?
>
> Relying on the last ACK received from the other direction looks promising.
> We record the last (highest) ACK sent by both endpoints, which makes sure
> the packet they ack they did indeed received. And we accept a RST segment
> only if it's in the window we calculate (wider than the destination's) AND
> equal or higher than the saved last ACK from the other direction.
>
> The only downside is that new fields must be added to struct ip_ct_tcp.
So here is the patch which adds checking RST segments against the highest
ack we seen from the other direction. I tested it with your script and
conntrack could resist receiving bogus RST segments.
diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp.h b/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp.h
index 3066789..b2f384d 100644
--- a/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp.h
+++ b/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp.h
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ enum tcp_conntrack {
/* Has unacknowledged data */
#define IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_DATA_UNACKNOWLEDGED 0x10
+/* The field td_maxack has been set */
+#define IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_MAXACK_SET 0x20
+
struct nf_ct_tcp_flags {
__u8 flags;
__u8 mask;
@@ -46,6 +49,7 @@ struct ip_ct_tcp_state {
u_int32_t td_end; /* max of seq + len */
u_int32_t td_maxend; /* max of ack + max(win, 1) */
u_int32_t td_maxwin; /* max(win) */
+ u_int32_t td_maxack; /* max of ack */
u_int8_t td_scale; /* window scale factor */
u_int8_t flags; /* per direction options */
};
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
index b5ccf2b..97a6e93 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c
@@ -634,6 +634,14 @@ static bool tcp_in_window(const struct nf_conn *ct,
sender->td_end = end;
sender->flags |= IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_DATA_UNACKNOWLEDGED;
}
+ if (tcph->ack) {
+ if (!(sender->flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_MAXACK_SET)) {
+ sender->td_maxack = ack;
+ sender->flags |= IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_MAXACK_SET;
+ } else if (after(ack, sender->td_maxack))
+ sender->td_maxack = ack;
+ }
+
/*
* Update receiver data.
*/
@@ -919,6 +927,16 @@ static int tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
return -NF_ACCEPT;
case TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE:
if (index == TCP_RST_SET
+ && (ct->proto.tcp.seen[!dir].flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_MAXACK_SET)
+ && before(ntohl(th->seq), ct->proto.tcp.seen[!dir].td_maxack)) {
+ /* Invalid RST */
+ write_unlock_bh(&tcp_lock);
+ if (LOG_INVALID(net, IPPROTO_TCP))
+ nf_log_packet(pf, 0, skb, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "nf_ct_tcp: invalid RST ");
+ return -NF_ACCEPT;
+ }
+ if (index == TCP_RST_SET
&& ((test_bit(IPS_SEEN_REPLY_BIT, &ct->status)
&& ct->proto.tcp.last_index == TCP_SYN_SET)
|| (!test_bit(IPS_ASSURED_BIT, &ct->status)
Best regards,
Jozsef
-
E-mail : kadlec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, kadlec@xxxxxxxxxxxx
PGP key : http://www.kfki.hu/~kadlec/pgp_public_key.txt
Address : KFKI Research Institute for Particle and Nuclear Physics
H-1525 Budapest 114, POB. 49, Hungary
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