On Mon, Aug 05, 2019 at 12:27:30PM +0200, Carlos Maiolino wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 02, 2019 at 08:14:00AM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > On Fri, Aug 02, 2019 at 11:19:39AM +0200, Carlos Maiolino wrote:
> > > Hi Darrick.
> > >
> > > > > + return error;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + block = ur_block;
> > > > > + error = bmap(inode, &block);
> > > > > +
> > > > > + if (error)
> > > > > + ur_block = 0;
> > > > > + else
> > > > > + ur_block = block;
> > > >
> > > > What happens if ur_block > INT_MAX? Shouldn't we return zero (i.e.
> > > > error) instead of truncating the value? Maybe the code does this
> > > > somewhere else? Here seemed like the obvious place for an overflow
> > > > check as we go from sector_t to int.
> > > >
> > >
> > > The behavior should still be the same. It will get truncated, unfortunately. I
> > > don't think we can actually change this behavior and return zero instead of
> > > truncating it.
> >
> > But that's even worse, because the programs that rely on FIBMAP will now
> > receive *incorrect* results that may point at a different file and
> > definitely do not point at the correct file block.
>
> How is this worse? This is exactly what happens today, on the original FIBMAP
> implementation.
Ok, I wasn't being 110% careful with my words. Delete "will now" from
the sentence above.
> Maybe I am not seeing something or having a different thinking you have, but
> this is the behavior we have now, without my patches. And we can't really change
> it; the user view of this implementation.
> That's why I didn't try to change the result, so the truncation still happens.
I understand that we're not generally supposed to change existing
userspace interfaces, but the fact remains that allowing truncated
responses causes *filesystem corruption*.
We know that the most well known FIBMAP callers are bootloaders, and we
know what they do with the information they get -- they use it to record
the block map of boot files. So if the IPL/grub/whatever installer
queries the boot file and the boot file is at block 12345678901 (a
34-bit number), this interface truncates that to 3755744309 (a 32-bit
number) and that's where the bootloader will think its boot files are.
The installation succeeds, the user reboots and *kaboom* the system no
longer boots because the contents of block 3755744309 is not a bootloader.
Worse yet, grub1 used FIBMAP data to record the location of the grub
environment file and installed itself between the MBR and the start of
partition 1. If the environment file is at offset 1234578901, grub will
write status data to its environment file (which it thinks is at
3755744309) and *KABOOM* we've just destroyed whatever was in that
block.
Far better for the bootloader installation script to hit an error and
force the admin to deal with the situation than for the system to become
unbootable. That's *why* the (newer) iomap bmap implementation does not
return truncated mappings, even though the classic implementation does.
The classic code returning truncated results is a broken behavior.
> > Note also that the iomap (and therefore xfs) implementation WARNs on
> > integer overflow and returns 0 (error) to prevent an incorrect access.
>
> It does not really prevent anything. It just issue a warning saying the result
> will be truncated, in an attempt to notify the FIBMAP interface user that he/she
> can't trust the result, but it does not prevent a truncated result to be
I disagree; the iomap bmap implementation /does/ prevent truncated responses:
: static loff_t
: iomap_bmap_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length,
: void *data, struct iomap *iomap)
: {
: sector_t *bno = data, addr;
:
: if (iomap->type == IOMAP_MAPPED) {
: addr = (pos - iomap->offset + iomap->addr) >> inode->i_blkbits;
: if (addr > INT_MAX)
: WARN(1, "would truncate bmap result\n");
Notice how we don't set *bno here?
: else
: *bno = addr;
And only set it in the case that there isn't an integer overflow?
: }
: return 0;
: }
:
: /* legacy ->bmap interface. 0 is the error return (!) */
: sector_t
: iomap_bmap(struct address_space *mapping, sector_t bno,
: const struct iomap_ops *ops)
: {
: struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
: loff_t pos = bno << inode->i_blkbits;
: unsigned blocksize = i_blocksize(inode);
:
: if (filemap_write_and_wait(mapping))
: return 0;
:
: bno = 0;
We initialize bno to zero here...
: iomap_apply(inode, pos, blocksize, 0, ops, &bno, iomap_bmap_actor);
...then pass bno's address to the apply function to pass to
iomap_bmap_actor, so either the _actor function set bno or in the case
of overflow it left it set to zero.
: return bno;
: }
> returned. And IIRC, iomap is the only interface now that cares about issuing a
> warning.
>
> I think the *best* we could do here, is to make the new bmap() to issue the same
> kind of WARN() iomap does, but we can't really change the end result.
I'd rather we break legacy code than corrupt filesystems.
--D
>
> >
> > --D
> >
> > > > --D
> > > >
> > > > > +
> > > > > + error = put_user(ur_block, p);
> > > > > +
> > > > > + return error;
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > /**
> > > > > --
> > > > > 2.20.1
> > > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Carlos
>
> --
> Carlos
