On Wed, 2008-11-19 at 15:32 -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> When the key is removed a second time the offset is set to 255 - this index
> is not valid for the ucode_key_table and corrupts the eeprom pointer (which
> is 255 bits from ucode_key_table).
> + if (WARN(priv->stations[sta_id].sta.key.key_offset == WEP_INVALID_OFFSET,
> + "Removing wrong key %d 0x%x\n", keyconf->keyidx, key_flags)) {
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->sta_lock, flags);
> + return 0;
> + }
So, since _this_ patch has been tested to fix the problem, the WARN_ON
must be triggering.
What are you doing to address the actual bug that causes it to trigger?
johannes
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