On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina <jikos@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote: > > [ ... snip ... ] >> Andi Kleen (1): >> x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok >> >> Dan Williams (13): >> x86: implement nospec_barrier() >> [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> p54: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> Thermal/int340x: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> net: mpls: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> udf: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> userns: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >> >> Mark Rutland (4): >> asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers >> Documentation: document nospec helpers >> arm64: implement nospec_ptr() >> arm: implement nospec_ptr() > > So considering the recent publication of [1], how come we all of a sudden > don't need the barriers in ___bpf_prog_run(), namely for LD_IMM_DW and > LDX_MEM_##SIZEOP, and something comparable for eBPF JIT? > > Is this going to be handled in eBPF in some other way? > > Without that in place, and considering Jann Horn's paper, it would seem > like PTI doesn't really lock it down fully, right? Here is the latest (v3) bpf fix: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856645/ I currently have v2 on my 'nospec' branch and will move that to v3 for the next update, unless it goes upstream before then.
