On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote: [ ... snip ... ] > Andi Kleen (1): > x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok > > Dan Williams (13): > x86: implement nospec_barrier() > [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > p54: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > Thermal/int340x: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > net: mpls: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > udf: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > userns: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > > Mark Rutland (4): > asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers > Documentation: document nospec helpers > arm64: implement nospec_ptr() > arm: implement nospec_ptr() So considering the recent publication of [1], how come we all of a sudden don't need the barriers in ___bpf_prog_run(), namely for LD_IMM_DW and LDX_MEM_##SIZEOP, and something comparable for eBPF JIT? Is this going to be handled in eBPF in some other way? Without that in place, and considering Jann Horn's paper, it would seem like PTI doesn't really lock it down fully, right? [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/attachmentText?aid=287305 -- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
