.snip. > > > This raises two issues: > > > 1) swiotlb_tlb_unmap_single fails to check whether the index generated > > > from the dma_addr is in range of the io_tlb_orig_addr array. > > That is fairly simple to implement I would think. That is it can check > > that the dma_addr is from the PA in the io_tlb pool when SWIOTLB=force > > is used. > > > I'm not sure this can fix all the cases. It looks to me we should map > descriptor coherent but readonly (which is not supported by current DMA > API). I think I am missing something obvious here. The attacker is the hypervisor, aka the owner of the VirtIO device (ring0). The attacker is the one that provides the addr/len - having that readonly from a guest perspective does not change the fact that the hypervisor can modify the memory range by mapping it via a different virtual address in the hypervisor? (aka aliasing it). > > Otherwise, device can modify the desc[i].addr/desc[i].len at any time to > pretend a valid mapping. With the swiotlb=force as long as addr/len are within the PA boundaries within the SWIOTLB pool this should be OK? After all that whole area is in cleartext and visible to the attacker. _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list Virtualization@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
