On Mon, 8 Apr 2013, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > On 04/08/2013 03:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > > This makes the IDT unconditionally read-only. This primarily removes > > the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory write attacks. It has > > an added benefit of also not leaking (via the "sidt" instruction) the > > kernel base offset, if it has been relocated. > > > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Eric Northup <digitaleric@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Also, tglx: does this interfere with your per-cpu IDT efforts? I don't think so. And it's on the backburner at the moment. Thanks, tglx _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list Virtualization@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
