Alan Stern <stern@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > The exploitability lies in what you mentioned above: that you have to > be aware of what you plug into your machine, and that devices that were > previously thought not to be corruptible actually are. Taken together, > these two ingredients make up a recipe for a social exploit: reprogram > an innocent-looking device and give it to someone who doesn't realize > how dangerous it could be. > > Furthermore, there's no reasonable way to test for this sort of attack. > That is, given a USB device, you can't easily determine whether the > firmware it contains is dangerous without exposing yourself to the > danger. The only effective defense is never to plug in a USB device > unless you know it has never been used by anybody else. This really isn't any different for any other bus protocol, is it? The only thing making USB special is that both ports and devices are so common. But you do have the same issue with Cardbus/ExpressCard devices, Thunderbolt devices or any other hotpluggable device with firmware in flash. And non-hotpluggable devices too, really. The PCIe ethernet card you bought on eBay could be programmed to do more than just ethernet. There is no way to tell without plugging it in. Bjørn (feeding the paranoia) -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-usb" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
