On Tue, Apr 23, 2024 at 05:30:52PM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > On Tue, Apr 23, 2024 at 4:21 PM Roberto Sassu > <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Tue, 2024-04-23 at 09:02 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked > > > > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to > > > > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type > > > > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant > > > > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. > > > > > > > > > > Stefan, > > > > > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > > > > > Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution. > > > > > > I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM > > > assertions, > > > including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode. > > > > I have hopefully a better idea. We should detect violations at each > > level of the stack independently. And IMA should be invoked each time > > overlayfs uses an underlying layer. > > > > That is currently not easy, from the IMA policy perspective, because > > there are filesystem-specific rules, such as fsname= or fsuuid=. At the > > moment, I'm not planning to solve this, but I'm thinking to use for > > example FMODE_BACKING to ignore the filesystem-specific keywords and > > match the rule anyway. > > > > For now, I'm only addressing the call to underlying layers. To make > > sure that IMA evaluates every layer, I added a rule that checks the > > inode UID: > > > > measure fowner=2000 mask=MAY_READ > > > > > > I just investigated a bit, and I made some changes (for now, I'm just > > making it work, and you tell me what you think). > > I did not examine this up close, but this seems like a change in the right > direction. > Will need Christian's approval that this does not break any assumptions > made on backing files. In principle I don't care if IMA wants to call yet another security hook in the backing file layer. I suspect it will impact performace if IMA is enabled. So that's something to keep in mind. But it's certainly better than blatantly abusing the dcache to achieve this. > > diff --git a/fs/backing-file.c b/fs/backing-file.c > > index 740185198db3..8016f62cf770 100644 > > --- a/fs/backing-file.c > > +++ b/fs/backing-file.c > > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ > > #include <linux/backing-file.h> > > #include <linux/splice.h> > > #include <linux/mm.h> > > +#include <linux/security.h> > > > > #include "internal.h" > > > > @@ -40,12 +41,16 @@ struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path > > *user_path, int flags, > > if (IS_ERR(f)) > > return f; > > > > + f->f_mode |= OPEN_FMODE(flags); > > + > > path_get(user_path); > > *backing_file_user_path(f) = *user_path; > > error = vfs_open(real_path, f); > > if (error) { > > fput(f); > > f = ERR_PTR(error); > > + } else { > > + security_file_post_open(f, ACC_MODE(flags)); > > } > > > > return f; > > > > > > Setup: > > > > # mount -t overlay -olowerdir=a,upperdir=b,workdir=c overlay d > > > > open is a tool with the following syntax: > > > > open <path> <perm> > > > > It performs the open, and waits for user input before closing the file. > > > > > > > > ToMToU (Time of Measurement - Time of Use): > > > > Same fs (overlayfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 1) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 2) > > > > This works: > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > > > This is the result of calling IMA at both layers, and the violation of > > course happens twice. > > > > This is also confirmed in the logs: > > > > Apr 23 14:52:45 fedora audit[994]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=994 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > Apr 23 14:52:45 fedora audit[994]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=994 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/d/test-file" dev="overlay" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > > > Different fs (overlayfs, btrfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 1) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file w (terminal 2) > > > > Again, this works despite the read is in overlayfs, and the write is in > > btrfs: > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > > > > The difference from the previous example is that now there is only one > > violation, which is detected only in the upper layer. The logs have: > > > > Apr 23 15:01:15 fedora audit[985]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=985 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/b/test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > > > Different fs (btrfs, overlayfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file r (terminal 2) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 d7a692e19158820d2755542a8d31b49ac7ac2729 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > > > > Works too. There is only one measurement, since that is done only for > > the upper layer. > > > > Apr 23 15:05:40 fedora audit[982]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=982 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > > > > > Open writers > > > > Same fs (overlayfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 2) > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > > > Apr 23 15:10:46 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > Apr 23 15:10:46 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/d/test-file" dev="overlay" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > > > Different fs (overlayfs, btrfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file r (terminal 2) > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > > 10 d7a692e19158820d2755542a8d31b49ac7ac2729 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/b/test-file > > > > Apr 23 15:12:58 fedora audit[984]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=984 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/b/test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > > > Different fs (btrfs, overlayfs) > > > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file w (terminal 1) > > # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 2) > > > > 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate > > 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file > > 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file > > 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file > > > > Apr 23 15:16:37 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 > > > > Roberto > > > > > I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix > > > the problem. > > > > > > Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO. > > > Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really > > > needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the > > > real inode. > > > I am sorry that we are failing to communicate on this matter, but I am not > > > sure how else I can help. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > Amir. > >
